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Non-Technical Summary
During the 1990s, patenting schemes changed in many respects: technological
and institutional conditions altered, upcoming new technologies accelerated
the shift from price competition towards competition based on technological
inventions, and the significance of strategic patenting increased. At the same
time, a drastic surge in patent applications took place. These developments
call for an investigation of patents’ importance for intellectual property (IP)
protection in subsequent years. In the context of the patent surge that was
not accompanied by a comparable surge in research and development (R&D)
expenditure, patents may rather indicate strategic behavior of firms, while
alternatives like secrecy - that has been found the more effective means of IP
protection by previous empirical research focusing on the early 1990s - may
be used for IP protection.
Patenting is a legal instrument for the protection of IP by granting the patent
holder a temporary monopoly on the patented technology including the right
to sue for infringement. However, patents bear the disadvantage that the
patented technology has to be disclosed in order to show the court and com-
petitors what is protected. This disclosure requirement uncovers profitable
technology fields and, moreover, patent data bases, open to the public, allow
an easy access to the patented knowledge. Thus, patenting conditions might
enable and even encourage rival firms to invent ‘around’ a patented innova-
tion. In order to avoid this, firms may prefer to keep their inventions secret
instead.
Previous research on IP protection methods focusing on the early 1990s when
the surge in patenting was still pending found that secrecy is the more ef-
fective means of IP protection as opposed to patents (Arundel, 2001, and
Ko¨nig and Licht, 1995). Those studies focus on the firms’ evaluation of the
respective IP protection methods to investigate their efficiency. In contrast,
this study is interested in the protected inventions’ success in the market to
measure the importance of patents as opposed to secrecy perhaps more ob-
jectively. The disclosure requirement of patenting makes patents and secrecy
mutually exclusive alternatives once an invention has entered the market.
Thus, this study introduces the sales figure with new products as a new
measure of the importance of IP tools among products innovating firms.
The focus is on product innovating firms in German manufacturing in 2000.
The Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) and patent information from the
German Patent and Trademark Office constitute the data base. In 2000, the
MIP identifies firms that use patents and firms that use secrecy as a means
of protecting their IP. The importance of patents and secrecy is proxied by
the protected inventions’ success in the market, which is ultimately reflected
in figures of sales with new products. Using tobit and instrumental variables
regression a significant positive correlation between patenting and sales with
new products turns out, whereas there is no effect for secrecy.
This finding is in line with the hypothesis that for product innovating firms
patenting is the more important method to protecting inventions in their
market phase as opposed to secrecy, even though over the recent years a
more strategic use of patenting has gained in importance. This result is
confirmed by survey evidence in the same year suggesting that patents are
more important than secrecy to protect IP from the firms’ point of view.
The frequent use of secrecy may be explained by its protective value for
early-stage inventions.
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Abstract
In the 1990s, patenting schemes changed in many respects: up-
coming new technologies accelerated the shift from price competition
towards competition based on technical inventions, a worldwide surge
in patenting took place, and the ‘patent thicket’ arose as a conse-
quence of strategic patenting. This study analyzes the importance of
patenting versus secrecy as an effective alternative to protect intellec-
tual property in the inventions’ market phase. The sales figure with
new products is introduced as a new measure for the importance of
IP protection tools among product innovating firms. Focusing on the
German manufacturing in 2000, it turns out that patents are impor-
tant to protect intellectual property in the market, whereas secrecy
seems to be rather important for early-stage inventions.
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1 Introduction
During the 1990s, important changes in patenting schemes took place: tech-
nological and institutional conditions altered, upcoming new technologies
accelerated the shift from price competition towards competition based on
technological inventions, and strategic patenting gained in importance. At
the same time, a drastic surge in patenting took place. These developments
call for an investigation of the importance of patenting for the protection of
intellectual property (IP). Since the patenting boom was not accompanied
by a comparable increase in research and development (R&D) expenditure,
patenting may rather indicate strategic firm behavior, while alternatives like
keeping a newly developed technology secret may be used for IP protection.
This paper analyzes the importance of patents and secrecy to protect inven-
tions in their market phase focusing on a sample of product innovating firms
in German manufacturing in 2000.
The patent system counteracts incentive problems arising from the public-
good character of IP. Knowledge is non-exclusive and non-rival. Competitors
may absorb, use and profit from knowledge without having to compensate the
inventor firm. Thus, the social benefit of knowledge is larger than the private
benefit and cannot be internalized by the inventor firm. Moreover, private
costs of creating knowledge may exceed private benefits, which generates an
incentive problem in producing IP. From a social point of view, this leads
to an underinvestment in an economy’s knowledge production. A patent is
an instrument to overcome this incentive problem by granting its owner the
right to sue for infringement in case someone makes use of the protected
technology. In other words, a patent is a legal means of giving the patent
holder a temporary monopoly on the protected IP.
However, to file a patent bears the disadvantage that the patented technology
has to be disclosed so that competitors and the court know, what is protected.
The disclosure requirement generates the patent holder some disutilities that
might outweigh the monopoly benefits. First, a patent hints at a presum-
ably profitable technology field. This enables competitors to jump on to a
technological trend by conducting further research related to the patented
technology. Second, publicly available patent information facilitates reverse
engineering of an invention and may, thus, encourage a larger number of rival
firms to invent around a patent.
Due to the disadvantages of the disclosure requirement in connection with
significant patent application costs and potential infringement costs - which
might be even higher than the application costs -, some firms may prefer
keeping their invention secret instead of filing a patent. IP protection by
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secrecy is, of course, free of charge, but has the disadvantage that the in-
vention is not legally protected against imitation or even duplication in case
the secret is leaked. Therefore, the firms’ decision to patent or to keep an
invention secret is considered a trade-off between the temporary monopoly
position a patent offers and the information spread a patent leads to.
Empirical studies focusing on the early 1990s, when the surge in patenting
was still pending, conclude that firms prefer secrecy over patenting to protect
their IP (e.g. Levin et al., 1987) and also that firms retrospectively consider
secrecy more effective than patenting (Arundel, 2001). However, significant
developments in the recent past concerning institutional and technological
conditions of patenting as well as the increased strategic value of patents
have evidently made patenting more attractive than it was before, as the
worldwide patent surge indicates.
Most drastic institutional changes took place in the US during the 1980s,
such as the Bayh-Dole act and the establishment of the Court of Appeal for
the Federal Circuit that strengthens the patent holders’ rights. Those devel-
opments pioneered for the pro-patent environment that gradually emerged
and ultimately spread far beyond US borders. However, institutional changes
in Europe were not overly drastic. The appropriation of IP has gained in im-
portance for Europe because of the endeavors of international harmonization
of the patent law, but also for reasons of competitiveness. Today, the decline
in competitiveness of European firms is partly seen as a consequence of their
patent behavior, which has been much less aggressive than in other patent
nations (Arundel, 2001). The European Commission reacted with the Green
Paper on Innovation, which puts application and defense costs as important
barrier’s for patenting up for discussion, and the First Action Plan for In-
novation in Europe, which encourages European firms, especially small and
medium sized firms (SMEs), to patent more. Furthermore, patent applica-
tion costs were lowered and grace periods have been fiercely discussed.1 In
addition, initiatives were promoted to support SMEs, and specifically high-
technology SMEs, with information and patenting programs.
Those institutional developments aimed at making patenting more attrac-
tive. However, empirical studies for the US, where the institutional changes
were more drastic, have shown that those changes cannot explain the recent
increase in patenting. Reasons for the surge in patenting can rather be found
in changes in firms’ R&D management and reallocations of their R&D port-
1Grace periods would permit the release of information about an invention without
loosing the right to apply for a patent at a later time, e.g. when a mechanical invention
requires external testing under the participation of another firm.
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folios (Kortum and Lerner, 1999) as well as in strategically motivated patent
races and in an improved patenting management of the firms (Hall and Ham,
2001, for the semiconductor industry).
Upcoming new technologies, like biotechnology and information technol-
ogy, as well as progresses in the information and communication technology
caused the changes in technological conditions and, further, accelerated the
shift from price competition towards competition based on technical inven-
tions. These developments may have led to an increased need for patents
providing legal IP protection in the face of a fiercer technological competi-
tion.
However, the strategic value of patents gained importance as well. Patents
became an important tool in licensing as well as in merger and acquisition
negotiations. The fact that patents, further, may increase firm value, gener-
ate profits from licensing, and serve as positive signals to potential investors
became important, especially in the context of an increased number of small
high-technology firms. Those firm often lack market power and the capabil-
ity to transfer every idea into a new product. For them, patenting is a way of
profiting from their inventions at least to a certain degree (Arundel, 2001).
A further development is that patents gained in value by their ability to
be linked with other patents, which encourages patenting of marginal inven-
tions. The resulting complex network of single patents that bears many legal
pitfalls for patent applicants was given the name ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro,
2001). These developments put into question an increased number of patents
motivated by an increased need for IP protection and hint at the strategic
value of patents to have driven the patent surge.
To summarize: on the one hand, recent changes in patenting schemes have
caused an elevated need for patents as an IP protection tool. On the other
hand, they gained in importance as strategic instruments.
A look at the development of R&D expenditure as the presumably most
important input factor for knowledge production provides a further argument
for the hypothesis that the increase in patents rather is motivated by their
elevated strategic value. The rising number of patent applications at the
German Patent and Trade Mark Office (GPTO) over time stresses the patent
surge in the 1990s for German firms. Figure 1 shows a continuous increase
in patent applications at the GPTO during the 1990s, whereas before and
after this period the number of filings is relatively constant. With a national
share of 83%, Germany was the largest applicant country at the GPTO in
2000. Germany is of considerable interest in the context of European patent
policy being the largest European patent applicant at the European Patent
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Figure 1: Filings at the GPTO
Office (EPO) with about 20,000 filings in 2000.2
In between 1990 and 2000, Germany’s patent applications grew by about
71% at the GPTO and at a similar rate of 68% at the EPO. In the same
time frame, Germany’s R&D expenditure grew by about 41% only.3 Since
this disproportionateness of patent applications and the presumably most
important production factor for knowledge can only partially be explained
by technological progress, it raises questions regarding the importance of
patenting for IP protection. Does patenting rather indicate strategic firm
behavior while IP is better protected by secrecy?
This paper investigates the importance of patents and secrecy after the 1990s’
significant changes in patenting schemes took place. As previous studies focus
on the firms’ evaluation of the different IP tools to measure their importance,
this study introduces the inventions’ market success as a new measure of the
importance of patents as opposed to secrecy for product innovating firms.
The importance of inventions protected by patents and such protected by
secrecy is distinguishable in the market phase, because patents and secrecy
2Patent data is taken from various annual reports of the GPTO. Patent applications are
defined as direct applications and Patent Cooperation Treaty applications in the national
or regional phase with effects in the Federal Republic of Germany. Note that German filings
with the EPO are included in the GPTO data with a one-year lag caused by priority.
3Information on R&D expenditure is taken from the Stifterverband (2003/04).
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are mutually exclusive for the particular invention once the invention has
entered the market. Inventions’ market success is measured by the sales figure
with new products. The focus is on product innovating firms in German
manufacturing in 2000.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: section 2 summarizes the recent lit-
erature, section 3 provides information on the data and descriptive statistics,
section 4 discusses the estimation results and section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
The literature on IP appropriation mechanisms was long time dominated by
the statement of Friedman et al. (1991) according to which no rational indi-
vidual with a patentable invention would fail to patent it. This attitude was
reflected in theoretical model assumptions without leaving any room for alter-
native instruments of IP protection.4 The underlying economic background
is the temporary monopoly a patent grants, which allows firms to secure
monopoly profits by protecting patented IP against undesired adaption by
competitors for a certain period of time. Thus, patents generate incentives
to innovate. The central problem discussed in the theoretical literature is
the trade-off between the inefficiency of the monopoly and the incentives to
innovate.5
Mansfield (1986) empirically analyzes the relationship between patenting and
innovation behavior within a random sample of 100 US manufacturing firms.
He finds that a substantial fraction of patentable inventions is not patented.
He further highlights large differences among industries. In some industry
sectors, like the pharmaceutical or chemical industry, the effectiveness of the
patent system is found to be substantial, and accordingly a large share of the
patentable inventions, about 80%, is patented. In other industries, patents
appear to be relatively unimportant. In the motor vehicle industry, e.g., the
share of patented invention is only about 60%. Mansfield (1986) concludes
that ”clearly, firms generally do not prefer to rely on trade secrecy protection
when patent protection is possible”.
A few theoretical papers focus on secrecy as an alternative IP protection tool
4See e.g. Tandon (1982) or Scotchmer (1991) for theoretical models basing on such
assumptions. Scotchmer (2004) provides a more balanced view.
5Seminal studies are provided by Nordhaus (1969, 1972). Denicolo` (1996) and Langinier
and Moschini (2002) provide surveys on this theoretical literature.
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(Horstman et al., 1985, and Anton and Yao, 2004)6. Analyzing the choice
to patent or to keep an invention secret, Anton and Yao (2004) point out
three important features for understanding the management of IP: first, the
incomplete information about the extent of an innovation, second, the lim-
itedness of IP protection, and third, the fact that imitation is facilitated by
disclosure. Horstman et al. (1985) and Anton and Yao (2004) develop in-
formation signaling models on the decision to patent or to keep an invention
secret with respect to strategic aspects.
The fact that neither patents - neither appropriability in the monopoly sit-
uation is perfect nor diffusion through public disclosure is ultimate after the
patent expires - nor secrecy, which may leak out, perfectly work as theory
suggests brought up a demand for empirical investigation.
Levin et al. (1987) pioneer the field with the so-called Yale I study, in which
they analyze survey data on firms’ appropriation activities in US manufac-
turing. They find that patents are not the most important mechanism of IP
appropriation. Secrecy, learning advantages as well as sales and service ef-
forts are more important. Furthermore, they detect significant inter-industry
variation regarding the use of IP protection instruments. In chemical and
pharmaceutical industry, patents are most often used and are considered to
be more effective than in other industry sectors. A further result is that
product innovations are better suited to patent protection than are process
innovations.
Cohen et al. (2000) add a consecutive study (Carnegy Mellon survey) for US
manufacturing. Their findings confirm the results by Levin et al. (1987): ac-
cording to them patents are the least emphasized instrument of IP protection
(compared to secrecy, lead time advantages, and the use of complementarity
marketing and manufacturing capabilities) for the majority of the sampled
firms. They further point out that the reason behind patenting in general
is not IP protection but strategic arguments, like bargaining power, cross-
licensing, and reputation. In addition, their results underline the significance
of industry differences, separating industries that usually introduce a ‘dis-
crete’ product (e.g. a new substance in chemical industry) from industries
that usually develop ‘complex’ products (e.g. a new product in the electronic
sector). Cohen et al. (2000) show that most patents are filed by the chem-
ical and pharmaceutical industry, and further that product innovations are
better suited to patent protection than process innovations. These results
confirm the findings of Levin et al. (1987).
6This list does not claim to be complete.
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The PACE report (Arundel et al., 1995) as the European counterpart of the
Carnegy Mellon survey focuses on the European Union’s 840 largest manu-
facturing and industrial firms located in Germany, the UK, Italy, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain, Denmark, and France. The findings
of the PACE report countersign important industry variations regarding the
effectiveness of IP protection tools for European firms. For Europe as for
the US, patents play an outstanding role in the pharmaceutical and chemical
industry for both, product and process inventions. Arundel et al. (1995),
further, find that patents and lead-time advantages are most important to
protect process inventions, whereas secrecy is most important to protect pro-
cess inventions in most industries. Moreover, Arundel et al. (1995) report
differences regarding the importance of IP protection methods among EU
countries. German firms, in general, consider a range of IP protection tools
effective compared to the other EU countries. Consequently, Germany shows
the highest patent rate.
In 1992, the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) of the European Commis-
sion starts dealing with questions on IP protection. Unlike the PACE study
that focuses on the largest European firms, the CIS takes SMEs into account.
The CIS I wave (1992) asked the firms to evaluate several legal and non-legal
methods of IP protection with regard to product and process innovations
separately. Respondents score the importance of the different IP protection
tools on a five-point likkert scale. Only few studies analyze this information.
Arundel (2001) focuses on the relative effectiveness of patents and secrecy
using the CIS I survey for six EU countries. He estimates ordered logit mod-
els on the relative efficiency of patents and secrecy. This approach has the
advantage that it takes into account unobserved firm heterogeneity. Arundel
(2001) concludes that secrecy provides an effective alternative for IP pro-
tection. Moreover, he finds that firms rate secrecy even more effective than
patents independent of firm size.
Ko¨nig and Licht (1995) investigate the importance of patents compared to
different non-legal IP protection methods using the CIS I wave for the Ger-
man manufacturing. Their results confirm the findings by Levin et al. (1987)
that non-legal IP protection instruments are more effective than the legal
tools. In contrast to the finding of Yale I, the study on Germany finds every
non-legal IP protection tool more effective for protection of product innova-
tions than patents. They further conclude that highly innovative firms rather
rely on a bundle of IP rights than on patents only. Further, the results for
Germany contrast with Arundel’s (2001) analysis for several European coun-
tries by stating that patents are more important for larger firms than for
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SMEs.
A drawback of the CIS I wave is that the firms are asked to evaluate the
different IP protection tools regardless as to whether they have ever used
the specific tools. Thus, the rating by firms that have never used patents or
secrecy gets the same weight as the scoring by experienced firms. The CIS
III wave, in contrast, asks the firms, which IP protection methods they have
used, and enables rating only to those firms that have actually used the IP
protection tool. Unfortunately, the questions in CIS I and CIS III differ by
such a high degree that a comparative analysis is impossible.
Hanel (2002) analyzes the use of IP protection for the Canadian manufac-
turing, paying attention to a possible effect on profits. As a first step, he
focuses on the propensity of innovative firms to protect their IP. He affirms
Mansfield’s (1986) results for Canada, which state that although firms do not
trust in the protective effect of those instruments, most of them use at least
one of them to protect their IP. Small firms are using IP protection tools
less often and world-first inventors use every kind of IP protection more fre-
quently than other firms. The Canadian survey provides information on the
impact of IP protection on profits. Firms rated this effect on a five-point
likkert scale. The scoring, however, is not related to particular IP protection
instruments. Hanel (2002) finds that firms, which protect their IP, state that
IP protection increased or maintained their profit.
This study analyzes the importance of patents and secrecy in terms of inven-
tions’ success in the market on the firm level using the CIS III survey data.
This data base allows me to identify the firms that have actually applied the
particular protection tools, which is a clear advantage compared to the CIS
I wave. Going beyond an investigation of the relationship between the use of
different IP protection tools by particular firms, this study analyzes the rela-
tionship of patents, secrecy, and sales with new products. The effectiveness
of different IP protection tools is measured in terms of the protected inven-
tions’ market success at the firm level. Are the most promising inventions
protected by patents or is it rather true that silence is golden?
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The underlying data base is the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), a survey
conducted yearly by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) on
behalf of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) since
1992. With its focus on the firms’ innovation behavior, the MIP is the
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German part of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) of the European
Commission. The CIS survey is conducted every fourth year, so far in 1992,
1996, and 2000. This paper bases on the CIS III wave that poses the question,
what IP protection tools the firms have used during the past three years. In
addition, patent information taken from the GPTO is used. The GPTO
data base contains all filings with the GPTO since 1979 and, further, all
EPO patents, which are valid in Germany (with a one-year lag caused by
priority). Patent data is used with a three-year lag to serve as an instrument
for patent activities in the 1998-2000 period.
The resulting sample consists of 626 observations of manufacturing firms in
Germany. All firms conduct R&D in the year 2000 and are product inno-
vators. 60% of the firms also conduct process innovations. Table 1 shows
descriptive statistics of the variables used in this paper.
3.1 Patenting, Secrecy and Firm Characteristics
More than half of the firms use patents (56%) to protect their IP. A somewhat
larger part of the firms uses secrecy (61%).7 The drawback of firm level data
is that it is impossible to distinguish what exactly is protected by patents
and what is protected by secrecy. Theoretical models focus on the invention
level and are thus able to tackle the question which IP tool is most suitable
for a particular invention. However, empirical research on the firm level
cannot tell, whether patents and secrecy are used for one or more particular
inventions, but focus on the use of patents and secrecy by firms in general.
41% of the sample firms employed patents and secrecy. 24% use neither
patents nor secrecy. The fact that firms tend to bundle different IP protec-
tion tools is found in previous studies (e.g. Levin et al., 1987). This creates
a blind spot for empirical research on the firm level, because there are many
ways to combine different IP protection tools possible (Arundel, 2001). A
prominent scenario is that patents tend to be used for the protection of prod-
uct inventions, which are more likely to become re-engineered than process
inventions, while secrecy is preferably applied to protect process inventions
(Levin et al. 1987, Cohen et al. 2000). Cohen et al. (2000) highlight dif-
ferent situations, in which a combined use of IP protection tools is possible,
even for a single invention. For example, different elements of a particular
7This percentage of secrecy users may seem to underestimate the use of secrecy, con-
sidering the fact that, in principle, every invention is kept secret in the very first phase of
the innovative process. On the other hand, the question, if the firms have applied secrecy
as a choice from a number of IP protection tools, is very likely to address those firms
that applied secrecy consciously to protect their IP. The similar percentage of firms that
applied patents and those, who used secrecy, supports this argument.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
variable unit mean std. dev.
patent [0/1] 0.56 0.50
secrecy [0/1] 0.61 0.49
sales new products thsd. ¿ 18.06 124.54
if >0 (437 obs.) thsd. ¿ 25.93 148.59
employment persons 644.74 3,494.48
R&D expenditure thsd. ¿ 8.93 83.44
R&D intensity ¿per emp. 9.83 15.73
non-R&D innovation exp. thsd. ¿ 2.55 35.31
patstock1997 patents per emp. 0.04 0.15
if >0 (337 obs.) patents per emp 0.07 0.19
East Germany [0/1] 0.33 0.47
HHI/1000 0.06 0.08
number of obs. 626
invention may be protected by more than one protection tool, a strategy that
is widespread in the chemicals industry (Arora, 1997). Moreover, different
IP protection tools may be used at different stages of the innovative process.
For example, secrecy may be applied in early states of the innovative process
and patents may be used to protect the invention when it is going to be com-
mercialized. After the invention has entered the market, however, patents
and secrecy are mutually exclusive for a particular invention because of the
patentings’ disclosure requirement. Anyway, the jigsaw character of the dif-
ferent possible combinations of protection tools limits the range of possible
insights of a firm level analysis.
In order to estimate the success of the differently protected inventions in the
market, the sales figure of new products is used as endogenous variable. The
MIP asked the firms to announce their cumulative sales with new products
in the past three years, i.e. 1998-2000. On average, the sample firms’ new
products had sales of about 18,000 ¿ , which corresponds to 12% of their
total sales. The censoring of firms without sales with new products, is about
30%. Excluding them, the average sales with new products is higher with
about 26,000 ¿ , equaling 17% of their total sales. To eliminate size effects,
the logarithm of sales with new products is used in the analysis.8
8In order to measure the success of process innovation, which is not captured by the
sales figure of new products, I employed a set of endogenous variables of cost reduction
10
It would be desirable to have panel data on the sales figure of new prod-
ucts to take into account a possibly larger lag between IP protection and
the commercialization of the invention. Unfortunately, the MIP is a highly
unbalanced panel, so only a small share of the sampled firms responded in
later years again.
An important regressor is the firms’ R&D expenditure, presumably the most
important input factor for innovation production. In the current sample with
about one third of SMEs, an average sample firm spends 8,930 ¿ on R&D
activities. The R&D intensity is calculated as R&D expenditure in terms
of employment and is used for regression instead of the R&D level variable,
since, on the one hand, R&D expenditure is highly correlated with firm size.
On the other hand, R&D intensity reflects the relative importance of inno-
vative activities to the respective firm. Firm size effects are taken separately
into account by considering the total number of employees. Company size is
in so far another important variable as that larger companies not only have
the capability to conduct more R&D than smaller companies, but also have
a better organizational structures and suffer less financial restraints. Larger
firms, therefore, are more likely to use IP protection tools and to have higher
sales with new products than small firms. An average sample firm has 645
employees. As the distribution of firm size shows a considerable skewness,
the logarithm of employment is used in the regression.
A further important regressor is the non-R&D innovation expenditure. Con-
taining every innovation expenditure, which is not R&D, this variable covers
marketing costs as well as further costs associated with the market entry of
a product. Again, the logarithm of the variable is used to take the skewness
of the distribution into account.
In the empirical section, one econometric approach requires to have an instru-
mental variable that is highly correlated with the current patent activity, but
has no impact on the sales with new products. Firms’ patent stock calculated
on the basis of the GPTO data base turns out to fulfil these conditions:
patstocki,t = patstocki,t−1(1− δ) + patent applicationsi,t,
where δ is a constant depreciation rate of knowledge which is set to 0.15 as
common in the literature (see e.g. Hall, 1990, and Griliches and Mairesse,
1984). The patent stock is used with a three-years lag as an appropriate in-
strumental variable for patent activities in 1998-2000. To take the skewness
(percentage of total sales, dummy variable, and absolute value). However, there was no
effect of the different IP protection tools.
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of the distribution into account, the patent stock is measured in terms of
employment. Furthermore, the logarithm is used. Zero values are set to the
sample minimum. An average firm in the current sample has a patents stock
of 0.04 patents per employee. Ignoring the 290 firms without any patent, the
average patent stock is slightly larger with 0.07 patents per employee.
Furthermore, firm location is taken into account using a dummy variable
that takes the value one for firms located in Eastern Germany and zero for
firms in Western Germany. Eastern Germany was a planned economy until
1989. The transition process into a market economy is still ongoing. Firms
in Eastern Germany are found to be still less innovative and less productive
than their Western German counterparts (Czarnitzki, 2004). In the current
sample, one third of the firms is located in Eastern Germany.
Moreover, the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) is used to control for intra-
industry competition. The HHI represents the domestic seller concentration
on the 3-digit NACE industry level. In the econometric model, the HHI is
lagged by three years to avoid simultaneity problems and is divided by 1,000
to get model coefficients in one range. Industry effects measured by four-
teen dummies turned out not to be statistically significant having controlled
for firm size, R&D intensity, and innovation strategies. Thus, they are not
further taken into account.
3.2 Innovation Strategies
Innovation strategies are an important issue if focusing on firms’ innova-
tive output. If a firm’s innovation activity targets at gaining market power
or competitiveness advantages, its sales with new products are likely to be
high, because the firm is in fierce competition and inventions must cope with
high technological standards. Another firm may innovate to improve internal
processes and make them more efficient. This innovation strategy is likely to
have affect rather the sales figure of new products in future years.
Different innovation strategies are identified by the effects of the firm’s inno-
vations in 1998-2000. Firms scored given options on a 4-point likkert scale,
where “3” corresponds to a high effect of their innovations on the respective
task and “0” indicates that there had been no effect on that task at all. The
possible effects of inventions are separated into three groups. The first group
is related to innovations’ effects on products and services:
 diversification of products or service offers (mean:2.31/std.dev.:0.78)
 entry into new markets or enlargement of market share (2.12/0.80)
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 quality improvement of products or services (2.26/0.79).
The second group of effects targets process and procedure related effects of
innovations:
 enlargement of product flexibility (1.61/1.10)
 enlargement of capability (1.73/1.05)
 decrease in personal costs (1.48/1.04)
 decrease in material and energy costs (1.24/0.98).
The third group describes further effects of innovations:
 improvement of environmental and health conditions (1.17/1.04)
 achievement of regulatory and standard conditions (1.24/1.08).
It turns out that the sample firm are most interested in new markets, larger
market shares as well as in quality improvements of their products and ser-
vices.
To detect innovation strategies underlying the effects of firm innovations,
standard factor analysis is conducted. Factor analysis allows to reduce the
dimensionality of the survey questions above by bundling the underlying
information according to variance analysis. Table 2 shows the result.
Table 2: Effects of Innovation and Innovation Strategies
factor loading matrix (varimax rotation)
factor 1 factor 2 factor 3
product related effects:
broader range of products/services 0.10 0.02 0.50
new markets/ larger market share 0.15 0.08 0.51
quality improvements of prod./serv. 0.28 0.28 0.17
process related effects:
higher product flexibility 0.71 0.16 0.10
larger capability 0.77 0.17 0.04
lower personal costs 0.78 0.13 0.06
lower material and energy costs 0.62 0.32 0.08
other effects:
improved environmental/health conditions 0.29 0.64 0.02
achieved regulatory/standard conditions 0.23 0.61 0.06
It turns out that three dimensions capture most of the variance in the scor-
ings, corresponding to the three groups of innovations’ effects defined in the
survey. The first factor is highly correlated with the second group, the pro-
cess improvement related effects of innovations. Innovation activities aiming
13
at a higher product flexibility, at a larger capability, as well as at lower per-
sonal, material, and energy costs can be interpreted as an internal or process
improvement strategy for innovating. The second dimension captures the
third group of innovations’ effects. Firms conduct innovation projects to
comply with environmental and health conditions as well as with regulatory
and standard conditions. Those firms follow a compliance strategy for in-
novating. The third dimension shows a correlation between diversification
of products or service offers and entry into new markets or enlargement of
market share the innovations led to. Those firms are innovative to get mar-
ket power or improve their recent position in the market. For the following
analysis, let’s call it a new markets strategy for innovating.
The different innovation strategies are supposed to have an impact on firms’
innovative success in the market. Firms that develop innovations to enlarge
their market share and to broaden their product pallet are supposed to have
higher sales with new products than firms, who innovate to lower their pro-
duction costs. Three score variables corresponding to the estimated factors
are included in further regressions to take into account the different innova-
tion strategies.
Furthermore, ‘industry strategies’ are focused on to account for sectoral het-
erogeneity. In some industries, like in basic metals, inventions often base on
relatively general principles of mechanical engineering and will therefore not
be patented, whereas in other industries, like in pharmaceutics, chemistry, or
high-technology industries, IP protection is supposed to be more important
(Arundel, 2001). The fraction of firms that applied patents and secrecy on
the 3-digit NACE level is taken into account to control for industry strategies.
4 Empirical Analysis
The empirical part of the paper analyzes whether patents and secrecy have
a positive impact on firms’ sales figures of new products to address the ques-
tion, whether patents or secrecy are more important to protect inventions
in their market phases. Endogenous variable is the logarithm of sales with
new products. The most important regressors are two dummy variables, one
controls for patenting, the second for application of secrecy. Tobit and in-
strumental variable (IV) regression is used. Table 3 shows the estimation
results.
The first column shows the tobit estimates. It turns out that there is a pos-
itive, statistically significant relationship between patenting and sales with
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Table 3: Success of Firms’ Innovation in the Market
endogenous variable: log(sales with new products)
tobit IV regressionA
coef. coef.
(t-stat)B (t-stat)B
patent 1.28*** 0.48*
(3.18) (1.65)
secrecy 0.49 0.41
(1.22) (1.03)
process strategy 0.12 0.12
(0.56) (0.56)
compliance strategy 0.25* 0.26
(0.95) (0.69)
new markets strategy 0.60* 0.58
(1.41) (1.35)
log(employment) 0.35** 0.28
(2.04) (1.39)
R&D intensity 0.03*** 0.03**
(2.91) (2.37)
log(non R&D inno. exp.) 0.14 0.17
(1.36) (1.61)
East Germany -1.24*** -1.19***
( -3.10) (-2.58)
HHI -1.38 -1.26
(-0.61) (-0.56)
constant -3.81*** -2.76***
(-3.76) (-2.29)
number of obs. 626 626
censoring 30% 30%
Log-Likelihood -1,452.76 -1,437.96
*** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
A The patent dummy is replaced by the estimated patent propensity.
B The t-statistics are based base on bootstrapped standard errors.
200 replications are used on the whole estimation procedure.
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new products whereas there is no effect for secrecy. The coefficient of se-
crecy is much smaller than the patent coefficient and the t-statistic is fairly
low. These findings are in line with the hypothesis that patenting indicates
valuable invention, although a shift in importance to a more strategic use
of patents took place. Among product innovating firms, patents are more
effective to protect inventions in the market than secrecy. Further, the sig-
nificant effect of patenting may provide a hint that patent protection is used
to secure monopoly profits, where they are large. Secrecy seems to play no
role at all among product innovating firms in the inventions’ market phase.
How does this fit a 61% share of sample firms that applied secrecy? One ex-
planation is that firms use secrecy to protect their inventions in early phases
of the innovative process, e.g. where the research outcome is still unclear,
rather than once the inventions have entered the market. A leaded endoge-
nous variable, which is, unfortunately, not available to me, could take these
early-state inventions into account. Another explanation might be that firms
use secrecy to protect their process inventions. Remember that 60% of the
sample firms also conduct process innovations, whose success is not captured
by the sales figure of new products. Including a dummy variable for process
innovating firms does not change the results and the estimated coefficient is
not statistically significant.
Looking at firms’ innovation strategies, it turns out that there is no impact of
a strategy that aims at improving internal processes, enlarging capabilities
and lowering costs of internal processes (process strategy). Such a strat-
egy rather creates a positive environment for later innovation activities than
raising current sales with new products. An innovation strategy aiming at
compliance with regulatory, health or environmental conditions (compliance
strategy), however, increases sales with new products. Innovations in that
context may be such that cope with new legal environmental conditions that
may concern a whole industry, e.g. in the motor vehicle industry. An early
inventor may easily profit from such an invention. Firms following a new mar-
kets strategy of innovation aiming at enlarging the market share or at the
entrance into new markets turn out to have significant larger sales with new
products than other firms. Those firms are likely to be high-technology firms
in a fierce competition and their products have to cope with high technolog-
ical standards. The presumably high quality of those inventions is mirrored
by sales with new products.
It, further, turns out that firm size mapping the capability of firms to conduct
R&D as well as R&D intensity, which measures the importance of R&D to
the respective firm, have a positive impact on sales with new products. Non-
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R&D innovation expenditure has no significant impact on sales with new
products.
Eastern German firms turn out to have significant smaller sales with new
products than their Western German counterparts. Innovative activity of
Eastern German firms leads rather to a catching up with the recent stan-
dards than to releasing products that are new to the market. Moreover,
there is no effect of intra-industry competition measured by the Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index (HHI).9
The first econometric specification ignores that patenting may depend on
the further regressors, e.g. on firms size and R&D intensity. This might
have driven the positive result for patenting in the previous regression. IV
regression is applied as an alternative econometric specification to take sus-
pected endogeneity of patent activities into account and check for robustness
of the positive result for patenting. In a first step, a probit regression on the
patent dummy is conducted to take the effects of the further variables into
account. The second step repeats the tobit estimation with the estimated
patent propensity included instead of the patent dummy.
When applying IV estimation, it is important to have at least one appro-
priate instrumental variable to identify the first step regression. Such an
instrumental variable has to provide a significant correlation with the deci-
sion to patent and must further not be fully or approximately fully explained
by the regressors in the outcome equation. I use the firms’ patent stock in the
year 1997 as instrumental variable. The lagged patent stock has a significant
impact on current patent activities, but there is no statistically significant
effect on sales with new products. The same holds for the fractions of firms
in an industry using patents and secrecy. Those variables serve as further
instruments.
Table 4 shows the results of the first step probit regression. It turns out
that the lagged patent stock has a positive impact on the patent propensity.
Firms apparently commit themselves to patenting. The persistence in patent
application shows that patents are an appropriate instrument for IP protec-
tion or for strategic issues or both from the patent holders’ view.
It further turns out that there is a strong correlation between the patent
propensity and the use of secrecy. Firms tend to apply both IP protection
instruments. This confirms the common finding of previous studies that firms
9An LR-test showed that fourteen industry dummies that had been included in an
alternative specification are not statistically significant.
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Table 4: First Step of the IV Regression: Probit Model
endogenous variable: patent dummy
coef. t-statA
log(patent stock1997) 0.14*** 6.74
secrecy 0.62*** 4.17
fraction of patent users in industry 11.18*** 6.03
fraction of secrecy users in industry -5.32 -2.63
process strategy -0.01 -0.07
compliance strategy -0.09 -0.61
new markets strategy 0.09 0.64
log(employees) 0.27*** 5.20
R&D intensity 0.01 1.44
HHI -0.32 -0.44
East Germany -0.33 -2.35
constant -1.14 -3.02
number of obs. 626
Pseudo-R2 0.31
Log-Likelihood -294.67
*** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
A The t-statistics are based base on bootstrapped standard errors.
200 replications are used on the whole estimation procedure.
tend to bundle different IP protection tools (Levin et al., 1987, Cohen et al.,
2000, Ko¨nig and Licht, 1995, and Arundel et al., 1995). Following Cohen et
al. (2000) and Arora (1997) there are many situations in which patents and
secrecy may be applied for one particular invention. Different IP protection
tools may be used to protect the invention in different development phases,
e.g. secrecy in the pre-market phase and a patent afterwards. Moreover, an
invention may be split in its single elements and both protection tools may
be applied for the particular elements. Focusing on the firm level, there are
even more situations in which firms may apply both instruments. For exam-
ple if a firm conducts product and process research, which holds for about
60% of the sample firms, they may prefer secrecy for their process inventions
and patents for their product inventions to prevent them from becoming re-
engineered.
The fraction of firms in an industry that uses patents measured on the 3-
digit NACE level shows the largest effect on the decision to patent. For the
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fraction of secrecy users, there is no effect. These variables capture industry
heterogeneity. The fact that patents’ importance varies across industries is
unanimously found by previous studies. In some industries, like basic metals,
inventions tend to be based on general engineering principles, that are not
patentable. Whereas in high-technology industries as well as in chemistry
and the pharmaceutical industry patents are supposed to be much more
important.
Innovation strategies on the firm level turn out to have no effect on the patent
decision.
Moreover, firm size has a positive impact on the patent probability, because
larger firms usually conduct more R&D, what enables them to file more
patents. In addition, large firm may have an own legal department and may
not suffer financial constraints to the same degree as small firms. This is of
great value in the case of infringement as potential infringement costs con-
stitute a significant barrier to patent. R&D intensity as a measure of the
importance of innovative activity to the firm turns out to have no impact on
the patent propensity. This finding contrasts, on the one hand, the finding
confirms the result by Arundel et al. (1995) that R&D intensity is not corre-
lated with the IP protection propensity. They interpret the result that size
effects are more important than R&D intensity by the organizational struc-
ture of the firms’ innovation activities, which is supposed to by determined
by size effects rather than by the R&D expenditure relative to firm size.
Having controlled for industry preference and firm size, there is, further, no
effect for firms located in Eastern German and the concentration index (HHI).
The second column of Table 3 shows the estimation results of the IV re-
gression. Instead of the patent dummy, the estimated patent propensity of
the probit model is used as a regressor. Patenting, again, has a significant
impact on sales with new products. The positive result of patenting is there-
fore approved if endogeneity of the patent activity is taken into account. The
further regressors loose in significance, because their influence on the patent
decision is already taken into account in the first step probit estimation.
R&D intensity is a significant factor in this model showing that sales with
new products increase with the importance of R&D. The positive effect is in
line with Arundel et al. (1995), who find that R&D intensity is positively
correlated with the importance of product patents. Moreover, the dummy
variable for Eastern German firms is still significant.
The empirical results confirm previous findings, e.g. regarding the tendency
of firms to bundle different IP protection tools or the relationship between
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patents, firm size, and R&D intensity for product innovators.
In contrast to prior studies that measure the effectiveness of different IP tools
by the firms’ valuation of that tools, this paper focus on the success of the
inventions in the market, measured by sales figure of new products. It turns
out that there is a strong positive correlation between patenting activities of
the firms and market success of their inventions, whereas there is no effect for
secrecy at all. This finding is robust if controlled for endogeneity of patenting.
This finding is in line with the hypothesis that patenting indicates valuable
inventions, although a shift in importance to a more strategic use of patents
took place in the past. Patents thus are interpreted to be the more effec-
tive tool to protect inventions in the market than secrecy. Furthermore, the
significant effect of patenting might provide a hint that patent protection
is used to secure monopoly profits, where they are large. Secrecy seems to
play no role at all among product innovating firms to protect a profitable
invention in the market phase.
As the previous regressions cannot ultimately rule out the argument that
patenting may have been strategically motivated in the first place, further
evidence for the hypothesis that patents are the superior instrument for IP
protection among product innovating firms is provided. The MIP question-
naire contains a question on the importance of the applied IP protection
tools. Those firms, who actually applied the particular tool, scored its im-
portance on a 3-point likkert scale, where 3 corresponds to “very important”
and one corresponds to “not important”.
Figure 2 shows the average importance of patents and secrecy for the sam-
ple firms for different firm groups with respect to their sales figure of new
products. The table below gives information on the numbers of observations
and the shares of respondents for each group. It becomes obvious that Ger-
man firms tend to find both IP tools important - the average importance of
patents and secrecy is always between “2” (little important) and “3” (very
important) -, which approves the result of Arundel et al. (1995). It turns out
clearly that patents are scored to be more important than secrecy in every
group. The gap between the average importance of patents and secrecy is
larger for firms with small shares of sales with new products. Those firms are
supposed to be the smaller firms, which might lack the capability to transfer
an invention into a new product. However, also firms with large shares of
new products, score patents to be on average more effective for IP protection
as opposed to secrecy.
Thus, this study concludes that patents are more effective for IP protection
among product innovating firms, which is approved by the firms’ point of
view.
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Figure 2: Effectiveness of Patents and Secrecy for IP Protection
share sales with new products 0% 0.01-4.5% 5-7% 8-14.62% 15-24% 25-100%
number of observations 190 81 87 93 80 95
response quota patents 61% 62% 54% 56% 64% 61%
secrecy 47% 60% 64% 56% 66% 62%
5 Conclusions
In the 1990s, patenting schemes changed in many respects: technological
and institutional conditions altered, upcoming new technologies accelerated
the shift from price competition towards competition based on technological
inventions, and strategic patenting became important. At the same time,
a worldwide surge in patenting took place. These developments raise the
question whether patents are still used to protect valuable inventions or if
they rather indicate strategic firm behavior, while alternative methods are
used for the protection of intellectual property (IP).
Patents are legal instruments to protect IP by granting the patent holder
a temporary monopoly position including the right to sue for infringement.
However, patents bear the disadvantage that the patenting firms have to dis-
closure the patented technology. This leads some firms to prefer secrecy as
a mutually exclusive IP protection tool.
In the early 1990s, empirical research found secrecy to be more effective for
IP protection than patents from the firms’ point of view. These studies use
the firms’ evaluation of the different IP tools to measure their importance.
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This study introduces a new measure of the importance of patents as opposed
to secrecy for product innovating firms focusing on the inventions’ success
in the market, where patents and secrecy are mutually exclusive due to the
disclosure requirement of patenting. Inventions’ market success is measured
by the sales figure of new products.
Focusing on product innovating firms in German manufacturing in 2000, after
significant changes in patenting schemes have taken place, a strong positive
correlation between patents and sales with new products turns out, whereas
there is no effect for secrecy. This finding is in line with the hypothesis that
patents are still used to protect valuable invention, although the patents’
importance as a strategic tool has significantly gained in importance. More-
over, patents turn out to be the more effective tool to protect inventions in
the market phase as opposed to secrecy, which is also applied by a large frac-
tion of the sampled firms. This result may indicate that patent protection
is used to secure monopoly profits, where they are large. Secrecy, however,
may be rather applied for early-state inventions that will enter the market
in a later period. Another explanation might be that firms use secrecy to
protect their process inventions, which is not captured by the sales figure of
new products. However, additional survey evidence is provided that patents
are more effective as opposed to secrecy from the firms’ point of view.
For further research on the importance of patents and secrecy, data on the
invention level would be desirable.
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